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ABSTRACT: Within the frame of discussions focusing on the provision of price 
stability, the central banks that attempt to enhance their independence have 
increased recently. Scientific studies in this field tend to support this discussion.  
The Central Bank of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) has been 
exceptional case due to the fact that Turkish Lira has been in circulation as a legal 
tender during the period of dollarization; and there is no relation between its 
inflation target and monetary policy. 
 
JEL Classifications: E31 ; E52; E58; K20 
 
Keywords: Central Bank independence; Legal aspect ; TRNC 
 
ÖZET:  Genel eğilim olarak fiyat istikrarını artırma yönünde odaklaşan tartışmalar 
çerçevesinde, Merkez Bankaları son zamanlarda bağımsızlıklarını artırma yönünde 
girişimde bulunmaktadırlar. Bu alanda gerçekleştirilen bilimsel çalışmalar ise bu 
tartışmaları destekler nitelik taşımaktadır. KKTC’de dolarizasyon kapsamında 
kanuni para olarak Türk Lirası’nın (TL) kullanılması ve dolayısıyla enflasyon hedefi 
ile para politikası ilişkisinin ortadan kalkması gerçeğinden hareketle Merkez 
Bankası bağımsızlığında KKTC  istisnai bir vaka olarak ele alınmıştır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Merkez Bankası bağımsızlığı ; Yasal yön ; KKTC 
 
JEL Sınıflaması: E31 ; E52; E58; K20 
 
 1. Introduction 
Most countries have implemented reforms designed to grant their monetary 
authorities greater independence from direct influence. These reforms were justified 
by studies showing independent central banks of industrial countries are associated 
with lower levels of inflation although this link is not previously evidenced for 
developing countries (Alesina and Summers, 1993; Cukierman, 1992).  However, 
subsequent research by Cukierman et al. (2002) shows that legal CBI and inflation 
are negatively related in both developed and developing countries. Both theory and 
experience suggest that more independent banks develop superior monetary policy, 
thus providing an incentive for this trend. Consequent to the latter, a remarkable 
trend has been observed toward magnifying independence (Mishkin, 2007: 326). 
This has been accompanied by a wave of legislations to confer independence on 
certain central banks (the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1990, the Bank of 
France 1994, the Bank of England in 1997,  the Bank of Japan in 1998, the  
European Central Bank from its creation in 1998) (Coleman, 2001: 729;  Mishkin, 
2007: 325-326). While the Federal Reserve is considerably independent central 
bank, the Maastricht Treaty, which established the Euro system, has made the latter 
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the most independent central bank in the world. The Maastricht Treaty specifies that 
the paramount, long-term goal of the ECB is price stability. The Euro system’s 
concession cannot be changed by legislation; it can be changed only by revision of 
the Maastricht Treaty- a difficult process because all signatories to the treaty must 
agree to accept any proposed change (Mishkin, 2007: 324). 
 
Parallel to developments taking place across the world, and particularly after the 
banking crises which have occurred in 2001 the TRNC Central Bank’s legislation 
has been revised, which targets to increase the autonomous independency and the 
effect of the central bank of  TRNC (Şafaklı, 2003). 
 
In this study, central bank independence of TRNC will be measured and compared 
to other countries by using the broadest employed index focusing on laws 
(Cukierman et al., 1992). 
 
2. Brief Literature Review and Research Methodology 
Central bank independence can be defined as the independence from political 
influence and pressures in the conduct of its functions, in particular monetary policy 
(Casu et. al., 2006: 127). Central-bank independence relates to three areas in which 
the influence of government must be either excluded or drastically curtailed (Hasse, 
1990): independence in personnel matters, financial independence, and 
independence with respect to policy. Not all scholars categorize the concept of 
central bank independence the same way, with different ones distinguishing 
different types of independence. Sylla distinguishes two meanings of independence: 
1) political and 2) legal independence (Sylla, 1998: 25). Likewise, Fischer has 
defined two different types of independence of central banks: instrument 
independence, the ability of central bank to set monetary policy instruments, and 
goal independence, the ability of central bank to set the goals of monetary policy 
(Mishkin, 2007: 321; Debelle and Fischer, 1994). Differently, central bank 
independence can be divided into “political independence” and “economic 
independence” (Loungani and Sheets, 1997: 382; Grilli  et. al.,  1991; Elgie, 1998: 
70). According to Issing (1993) personal elements of independence can be cited. In 
addition to these, Baka (1994-95) states that central bank independence is analyzed 
by taking into account three aspects: a) institutional independence, b) functional 
independence and  c) financial independence. 
 
The most widely employed index of central bank independence is due to Cukierman 
et. al., (1992), although alternative measures were developed by Bade and Parkin 
(1984), Grilli et. al.,  (1991), de Haan and Van ‘T Hag (1994)  among others. 
 
In order to measure the degree of independence of Northern Cyprus Central Bank, 
the index of Cukierman, at al (1992) also called as the legal central bank 
independence has been used. According to this index, the legal characteristics of the 
central bank as stated in its charter are grouped into four clusters of issues:  1)The 
appointment, dismissal, and term of office of the chief executive officer of the bank; 
2) The policy formulation cluster, which concerns the resolution of conflicts 
between the executive branch and the central bank over monetary policy and the 
participation of the central bank in the budget process; 3) The objectives of the 
central bank; and 4)  Limitations on the ability of the central bank to lend to the 
public sector; such restrictions limit the volume, maturity, interest rates, and 
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conditions for direct advances and securitized lending from the central bank to the 
public sector. This four clusters were built up from 16 different legal variables as 
shown in Table 1, each coded on a scale of 0 (lowest level of independence) to 1 
(highest level of independence). The codes are set to a stronger mandate and greater 
autonomy for the central bank to pursue price stability. This 16 variables weighted 
accordingly are aggregated to reach an index value for the respective country. 
 
Table 1. Variables for Legal Central Bank Independence 
Variable 
Number Description of Variable Weight 
1 Chief executive officer(CEO)  
 a. Term of office 0.05 
 b. Who appoints CEO? 0.05 
 c. Dismissal  0.05 
 d. May CEO hold other offices in government? 0.05 
2 Policy formulation  
 a. Who formulates the monetary policy? 0.05 
 b. Who has the final word in resolution of conflict? 0.05 
 c. Role in the government’s budgetary  process 0.05 
3 Objectives  0.15 
4 Limitations on lending to the government  
 a. Advances (limitations on non-securitized lending?) 0.15 
 b. Securitized lending 0.10 
 c. Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) 0.10 
 d. Potential borrowers from the bank 0.05 
 e. Limits on central bank lending defined in  0.025 
 f. Maturity of loans 0.025 
 g. Interest rates on loans must be 0.025 
 h. Central bank prohibited from buying or selling  0.025 
   Total weight 1.00 
 (Source: Cukierman et. al., 1992) 
 
According to Cukierman’s (1992) index values among the 22 industrial countries the 
most independent central banks were Switzerland (0.68), Germany (0.66) and 
Austria (0.58) while the least ones were Norway (0.14), Japan (0.16) and Belgium 
(0.19) (Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996: 23). Even though this was the case in 1990’s 
most of these countries have taken remarkable steps to improve their central bank 
independence. Specially, the model of European Central Bank became the leader of 
legal independence protected by Maastricht Treaty after its introduction. 
 
3. Case of TRNC 
The independency of TRNC Central Bank is different from any other banks 
analyzed across the world. As understood above the fundamental argument for the 
independency of central banks’ is to achieve price stability by pursuing independent 
monetary policy. However, there is no relation between the inflation target of TRNC 
and its monetary policy due to the fact that Turkish Lira has been in circulation as a 
legal tender during the period of dollarization. This makes the inflation occurring 
within Turkey as the basis originator of inflation for TRNC. Figure 1 illustrates the 
inflation for TRNC and Turkey in parallel with respect to each others.  
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Figure 1. Inflation Rate in Turkey and Northern Cyprus ( 1986-2007) 
Source:  Northern Cyprus State Planning Organization- State Statistical Institute of Turkey 
 
Time-series analysis as detailed below can be conducted to examine the interaction 
between the inflation rates of two countries. 
 
The following table reports unit root test for inflation rates in Turkey between 1986 
and 2007.  To test whether the series are stationary or non-stationary, we use the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.  The null hypothesis is that “There exists unit 
root”. If the ADF test statistic is greater than the critical values, then we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis and we conclude that there is a unit root and the series is 
non-stationary. Non stationary series, in turn, need to be made stationary in order to 
complete the rest of the time-series analysis. Table 2 provides the unit-root test 
output. First off, we test for the existence of a unit-root in level with no trend and no 
intercept, with a lag specification of 1. 
 
Table 2. Unit –Root Test Output with No Trend and No Intercept 
ADF Test Statistic -0.760759 
    1%   Critical Value* -2.6889 
    5%   Critical Value -1.9592 
    10% Critical Value -1.6246 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(TR) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/26/09   Time: 13:44 
Sample(adjusted): 1988 2007 
Included observations: 20 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
TR(-1) -0.057827 0.076012 -0.760759 0.4567 
D(TR(-1)) -0.335048 0.212467 -1.576940 0.1322 
R-squared 0.156352 Mean dependent var -2.335500 
Adjusted R-squared 0.109482 S.D. dependent var 23.42764 
S.E. of regression 22.10802 Akaike info criterion 9.124397 
Sum squared resid 8797.760 Schwarz criterion 9.223970 
Log likelihood -89.24397 Durbin-Watson stat 2.148290 
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The test-statistic of -0.76 is greater than the critical values at 1, 5 and 10% 
significance levels. Therefore, we are not able to reject the null hypothesis. This 
means the series are non-stationary. We then test for unit root with trend and trend + 
intercept (Table 3), but the results turn out to be similar. Next, we test for unit root at 
the series’ first difference. The ADF test statistic is smaller than the critical t-values, 
therefore we reject the null hypothesis and we conclude that the inflation series 
becomes stationary at its first difference.  
 
Table 3. Unit –Root Test Output with Trend and Trend + Intercept 
ADF Test Statistic -4.388371 
    1%   Critical Value* -2.6968 
    5%   Critical Value -1.9602 
    10% Critical Value -1.6251 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(TR,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/26/09   Time: 13:19 
Sample(adjusted): 1989 2007 
Included observations: 19 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(TR(-1)) -1.631458 0.371768 -4.388371 0.0004 
D(TR(-1),2) 0.146683 0.221381 0.662580 0.5165 
R-squared 0.730781 Mean dependent var -1.124211 
Adjusted R-squared 0.714945 S.D. dependent var 40.60609 
S.E. of regression 21.67982 Akaike info criterion 9.089941 
Sum squared resid 7990.247 Schwarz criterion 9.189356 
Log likelihood -84.35444 Durbin-Watson stat 1.993263 
 
Now we repeat the same process for the inflation rates in TRNC. The table 4 
provides the unit-root output for TRNC inflation rates at the level, no intercept and 
no trend. 
 
Table 4. Unit-Root Output for TRNC Inflation Rates at the Level, No Intercept 
and No Trend. 
ADF Test Statistic -0.982688 
    1%   Critical Value* -2.6889 
    5%   Critical Value -1.9592 
    10% Critical Value -1.6246 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(TRNC) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/26/09   Time: 13:56 
Sample(adjusted): 1988 2007 
Included observations: 20 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
TRNC(-1) -0.139217 0.141669 -0.982688 0.3388 
D(TRNC(-1)) -0.463384 0.206419 -2.244866 0.0376 
R-squared 0.316667 Mean dependent var -1.680000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.278704 S.D. dependent var 51.37183 
S.E. of regression 43.62966 Akaike info criterion 10.48399 
Sum squared resid 34263.85 Schwarz criterion 10.58356 
Log likelihood -102.8399 Durbin-Watson stat 2.144018 
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As the t-statistic reveals, we are not able to reject null, therefore the series are non-
stationary. Repeating the unit-root testing with trend and intercept reveals similar 
results (Table 5). We, in turn, look for a unit-root in the series’ first difference. 
 
Table 5. Unit-Root testing wit Trend and Intercept 
ADF Test Statistic -7.860098 
    1%   Critical Value* -2.6889 
    5%   Critical Value -1.9592 
    10% Critical Value -1.6246 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(TRNC,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/26/09   Time: 13:56 
Sample(adjusted): 1988 2007 
Included observations: 20 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(TRNC(-1)) -1.530291 0.194691 -7.860098 0.0000 
R-squared 0.764795 Mean dependent var -0.235000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.764795 S.D. dependent var 89.88057 
S.E. of regression 43.59023 Akaike info criterion 10.43625 
Sum squared resid 36102.06 Schwarz criterion 10.48604 
Log likelihood -103.3625 Durbin-Watson stat 2.199574 
 
At first difference, we are able to reject null and the series have become stationary at 
their first difference. Now that both series have become stationary at their first 
differences, we can conclude that both series are integrated of order 1. We can now 
test for co-integration between the series. In order to do so, we need to examine the 
properties of the regression residuals. The first step is to estimate the least squares 
regression (Table 6). 
 
Table 6.  Least Squares Regression 
Dependent Variable: TRNC 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/26/09   Time: 14:42 
Sample: 1986 2007 
Included observations: 22 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -8.665612 9.716077 -0.891884 0.3831 
TR 1.176565 0.153642 7.657817 0.0000 
R-squared 0.745684 Mean dependent var 56.09091 
Adjusted R-squared 0.732968 S.D. dependent var 43.42982 
S.E. of regression 22.44243 Akaike info criterion 9.146292 
Sum squared resid 10073.26 Schwarz criterion 9.245478 
Log likelihood -98.60921 F-statistic 58.64216 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.260558 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Next, we generate the residuals from the regression equation. Finally, we perform a 
Dickey-Fuller test by regressing the change of residuals (dres) on lagged residuals 
(lagres) and the lagged term (laggedterm) (Table 7).  
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Table 7.  Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dependent Variable: DRES 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/26/09   Time: 14:38 
Sample(adjusted): 1988 2007 
Included observations: 20 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
LAGRES -0.996696 0.357764 -2.785904 0.0122 
LAGGEDTERM -0.116985 0.232405 -0.503368 0.6208 
R-squared 0.575490 Mean dependent var 1.067867 
Adjusted R-squared 0.551907 S.D. dependent var 33.72129 
S.E. of regression 22.57296 Akaike info criterion 9.166022 
Sum squared resid 9171.693 Schwarz criterion 9.265595 
Log likelihood -89.66022 Durbin-Watson stat 1.886922 
 
Since the calculated Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.786 is less than the 5% critical 
value of -1.96, we reject the null of no co-integration. The variables, therefore, are 
co-integrated. 
 
3.1 Monetary Targeting in TRNC 
With the contribution of the State Planning Organization, alternative to the central 
bank at the technocrat level, government determines development plans and annual 
programs for the economic targets in TRNC. Especially the “Program for 
2008”specifies %5 of real growth rate, and %5 of inflation has been targeted (SPO, 
2007).  Both the real and sectored plans are based upon the growth rate. Despite of 
the fact that finance and budget policies are not included within the economical 
programs, monetary policies are not also included within the economical targets and 
this fact is reflected within the annual reports. Because the TRNC Central Bank acts 
as “Banking Regulation and Inspection Institute” rather than nourishing monetary 
policy with respect to the economical targets (TRNC Central Bank, 2006).  
 
Consequently, TRNC Central Bank does not have a clear target in constituting price 
stability. Granted that the considerable part of inflation in TRNC is the result of the 
“Purchasing Power Parity” which ascends from Turkey, while the remaining part is 
the result of peculiar demand and cost factors of TRNC.   
3.2 The Degree of Central Bank Independence in TRNC 
By using the Cukierman at al. (1992), legal independence of Central Bank in TRNC 
has been measured by examining the TRNC Central Bank law (Law No 41/2001). 
 
Table 8.  Legal Central Bank Independence of TRNC 
Variable 
Number Description of Variable Weight 
Assigned 
Numerical 
Coding 
Weighted 
Result 
1 Chief executive officer(CEO)    
a. Term of office 0.05 0.50 0.0250 
b. Who appoints CEO? 0.05 0.25 0.0125 
c. Dismissal  0.05 0.83 0.0415 
d. May CEO hold other offices in 
government? 0.05 0.50 0.0250 
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Table 8. Continue 
2  Policy formulation    
a. Who formulates the monetary policy? 0.05 0.67 0.0335 
b. Who has the final word in resolution 
of conflict? 0.05 0.33 0.0165 
c. Role in the government’s budgetary  
process 0.05 0.80 0.0400 
3 Objectives  0.15 0 0 
4 Limitations on lending to the government    
a. Advances (limitations on non-
securitized lending?) 0.15 0.67 0.1005 
b. Securitized lending 0.10 0 0 
c. Terms of lending (maturity, interest, 
amount) 0.10 0.33 0.0330 
d. Potential borrowers from the bank 0.05 1 0.0500 
e. Limits on central bank lending 
defined in  0.025 0.33 0.0082 
f. Maturity of loans 0.025 0.67 0.0167 
g. Interest rates on loans must be 0.025 0.25 0.0062 
h. Central bank prohibited from buying 
or selling government securities in the 
primary market 
0.025 1 0.0250 
Aggregate legal central bank independence level 0.43 
 
Interpretation of the results above (Table 8) according to variable basis can be given 
as follows:  
 
Variable 1-Chief Executive Officer 
a. Term of office; the answer for this indicator is governors’ duty in the central 
bank is for five years. This is defined in the Article 13 of the law also in the 
article defines that governor can be appointed again by the ministries council at 
the end of term. In some of the developed countries, this period is between 6-8 
years and in some of them it is more than 8 years. Basically length of the period 
shows, the stability of the decisions and decisions on monetary policies could be 
changed accurately according to their impact.  
 
b. Who appoints CEO; the answer for this variable is executive collectively. This 
is an important variable because the relationship between the government and 
governor is stated by law but if the governor and government decide some 
policies behind the closed doors then there will be no independence to consider. 
And if the executives or prime minister can affect the decision making process 
by putting pressure on governor. The most independent central banks appoint 
the governors by board of the central bank but this process can create lack of 
transparency. In order to protect transparency and also the ability to control 
most governments appoints the governor by themselves. For the TRNC Central 
Bank it is stated in the Article 13. 
 
c. Dismissal; this rule stated in the article 18 which can be interpreted as dismissal 
is requested only with conditions which are not related to policy. If governor 
has the freedom to give decisions upon monetary policy, then the corresponding 
decisions could either be safe or risky. Because in the state of unexpected 
consequences governors can take risky standpoint. 
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d.  May CEO hold other offices in government; this is stated in the Article 13 of 
the law that only with the permission of the executive branch. Basically it 
means that the governor cannot work in other bodies of government or in other 
places which is the first objective of earning money. The law prescribes that 
only in such places of associations or cooperatives that is not related with 
money or the first objective is not earning money. Central banks are lender of 
last resorts, they are the bosses of the markets and if executives of the central 
bank will have duties in other offices then the market will know the actions of 
the bank and they will be prepared for the situation. So this will start domino 
effect before the action of the central bank. For example, in a financial crisis if 
the actions of the bank are known before from the public to prevent the crises 
will be hard for them because some speculative attacks can occur and also there 
will be some opportunists that want to make some money. Also the executives 
try to use the situation of the market for their own benefit.  
 
This is an important variable which has many different sides. We can consider 
from the government side, the market side and or the executives side. Also the 
vice versa is possible. From the government side accountability has to be 
considered but governors must not have a position in the government because 
executives can interfere the policy. For the market side transparency is 
important for the stability of the financial system but knowing the key 
information before applied can collapse the market. And for the executives’ 
side, to work in other offices may put some pressure on them and working in the 
public is not a preferable issue because executives can use the situation for their 
benefit. 
 
Variable 2-Policy Formulation 
a. Who formulates monetary policy; for this indicator answer is bank participates, 
but has little influence. As stated in the fifth article central bank formulates the 
monetary policy but together with many different objectives. For it to have 
control over monetary policy, using to tools of money is very important. When 
there is a need of liquidity money supply has to be increased by the amount or 
to prevent increase in the prices according to excess of cash money than money 
supply has to be gathered. To increase or decrease money supply, central bank 
uses some tools for it, discount rate ratio, open market operations and required 
reserve ratio rate. Most effective one in the short-term is open market 
operations. It is done by selling or buying the government securities. For 
making the monetary policy by central bank it self, gives the best results for 
monetary policy and for this reason the grooving trend in the world is to make 
central banks more independent to achieve low inflation rates.  
 
Northern Cyprus has no printed currency; the Turkish Lira is being using 
instead of a national currency. So this process considerable impact on the 
monetary policy. If there is no power to print money, how the money supply can 
be set. The basic power of monetary policy is the money or currency. If there is 
no official currency, then there will be no effective monetary policy. The only 
thing that central bank can do is to control the financial institutions, or to supply 
them credit for to be in liquid position. Or central bank can control with the 
credit value of the market but it is not a short-term policy and it’s hard to get 
efficient results from policy. Also central bank cannot control the foreign 
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currency rates which have a great effect on the system. So, not having a printed 
currency effects monetary policy and lose control over all the financial system. 
 
b. Who has the final word in resolution of conflict; this has no clear definition in 
the law that states so. This is a tricky variable, because if there is a conflict for 
the policy issues between the government and central bank, central bank must 
have the right to say the final word. But if government is the final authority then 
there will be no independence for central bank. Actually governments by 
themselves give authority to central banks to achieve better results for inflation 
but hold the authority of to right to say the final word on conflicts with the main 
objective. Also by saying the last word government can act as they wish so. 
This is dangerous, because politicians can over heat the economy before the 
election period and this can be seen as growing economy. But in the long-term 
it can create financial crises and can increase the inflation. But in another way 
this can control the central bank. The effectiveness of this issue is directly 
related with the personalities of the both sides.  
 
c. Role in the government’s budgetary  process; in article five, it states that if  
anything is asked by the government from central bank, they will give any 
support, they can. But if they are active in the budget, than government can take 
advances from central bank which is not a desirable situation. Because if this 
process becomes permanent then the inflation problem becomes permanent too. 
According to article, central bank is not directly active but in case if needed, 
central bank can involve. 
 
Variable 3-Objectives 
Objectives of a central bank define the stability of that system. If a central banks 
main objective is price stability and including of increased independence then the 
financial system can be stable to the shocks that can be occur unexpectedly. Legally 
specified objectives indicate the level of independence of a central bank. Because 
specified objectives such as preventing the price stability against one of the 
government objectives of full employment, makes bank more independent. 
 
For TRNC Central Bank, this is not clearly defined in the law. Central has many 
objectives such as supporting the government objectives of full employment, growth 
plans and financially stable economic system together with their objectives of 
setting the credit volume and control over the banking system in Northern Cyprus. 
So objectives of the central bank are conflicting with the government objectives and 
according to this situation when a problem occurs suddenly, central bank cannot 
intervene directly to stabilize the system. Because there will be a huge bureaucracy 
to pass through. 
 
Variable 4-Limitations on lending to the government 
a. Advances; advances to government which stated in the article 34, represents the 
privilege of the government to get numerous funds against debts. Advances to 
government defined in the law as 5 percent of governments’ total budget and in 
any case advances cannot excess 20 percent of the central bank liabilities. This 
can set some limitations on the government but the customs between the central 
bank and government should be known briefly to understand whether they 
excess these limits or not by different procedures. 
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In other counties the system defines the rules on this variable, like the countries 
that are developing and financial agreement with the IMF generally has coded 
0.67, defined as the strict limits up to 15 percent of governments’ revenue, 
because these countries has weak economies with selfish politicians that limits 
should be defined strictly or else opportunities of bank can be used by them. 
Also in developed countries limits are strictly controlled by constitution that 
independence is a hallmark of their systems. 
 
Amount and volume of advances are really important for an economy. If the 
volume is higher than the production, then there will be excess money supply 
that will increase money demand too, and according to process inflation will 
rise, and if central bank does not intervene to rise than the inflation can cause 
some big crashes on the economy. 
 
b. Securitized lending; there are no legal limits on securitized lending which is 
stated in the law. Actually, there are no securities or bonds that government 
issue to close the debt in TRNC. But this must be stated clearly to define 
whether permitted or not. Because future actions of politicians will not be 
known from anyone, and what will happen to economy cannot exactly be 
explained by the economists. 
 
For a central bank to be independent in this way, the variable should be known 
but not permitted. Generally this variable is not defined in the law. This concept 
is not often used regularly until there is problem in the financial system within 
the economy. 
  
c. Terms of lending; is stated in the 34. Article in the law. It is agreed between the 
central bank and executive. At first glance, this can be seen as a small issue 
which is essentially significant. Terms and maturity must be defined by the 
central bank itself to keep the system stable. Amount is the most important one 
in the terms of lending variable. Because government can take whatever is 
needed and if the amount is huge then taking all promptly may cause problems. 
Ultimately, maturity is the duplicate effect as the other subjects.  If government 
does not pay the amount on time, it matures then central bank has to supply this 
money from somewhere else with using tools that it has. This is an undesirable 
condition that costs too much for bank itself and also for the economy too. This 
shows us that in TRNC Central Bank politicians and executives has authority as 
they like. Such cases occur in developing countries related with the weak 
political system. In order to be an independent bank, the bank should be fully 
authorized to say the final word on lending procedures and also for the 
monetary issues. If the terms of lending defined explicitly and held strictly by 
the central bank, economy will survive from short-term attacks but governments 
may feel the need for privilege to keep things working on track accordingly to 
the law.  Executives cannot get advances from the bank to fulfil the 
commitments that they have to. In order to fulfil the commitments, governments 
get foreign credit or loan that has heavy responsibilities with strict rules. It will 
be right to say that banks may sometimes give more harm when trying to 
protect the financial systems.  
 
d. Potential borrowers from the bank; this is stated in the 34. And 37. Articles in 
the law, which states that only central government, can borrow from the central 
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bank. This is not clearly defined in the law. The more institution borrows from 
the central bank, the more central bank has to give and control. In case of 
increase in the number of potential borrowers, the volume of money will be 
high, leading to the occurrence of inflation. If also the number of borrowers 
increases, the terms of lending will change consequently affecting the financial 
systems. Reasons for this are that there will be several terms of credit given by 
the bank and setting the interest rate interval will be immense.   
 
For this variable, the most independent but not full explanation will be to say 
that only central government could borrow from the bank. Note that government 
cannot borrow from the bank directly as in the circumstance where it is 
independent from the central bank. With this explanation, mentioned variable 
conflicts with the above variables noted.  
 
e. Limits on central bank lending defined in; the 34. Article of the law defines the 
shares of the government revenue. Central bank can give advance to the 
government as 5 percent of the governments’ budget or with not excess 20 
percent of the central bank liabilities in total. This is an important variable that 
defines the limitations to government lending. If central bank gives without any 
limit on credit than regime may take place whenever needed, and the above 
mentioned problems of high inflation, lack of administration, benefit to 
politicians and etc. may materialize.   
 
f. Maturity of loans; is not defined in the law. Only in the 34. Article; the loans 
must be paid in short-term. This is a general definition that could ensue within a 
month or a year. In practice, loans are paid back within a year back to the 
central bank. Governments generally adopt loans to balance the budget at the 
end of the financial year.  
 
Maturities of loans are important for the shocks that could occur in the 
economy. If the maturity of the loans expires in a long period then economic 
shocks may occur. The ability to pay the loan back to the central bank will be 
very difficult and additionally during the succeeding budget period, central bank 
will be in a complex status to fund back the government. So maturities must be 
defined and controlled accurately.   
 
g. Interest rates on loans must be; in the law, interest rates are not acknowledged 
by exact numbers. It is hazardous to the funding capability of the central bank, 
because if government takes loans at very low rate with huge amounts then 
there will be less reserve to feed the market. In practice, the rates that central 
bank use are around the market rates, it will be always below the market rates 
but not too extreme to become the only source of the government or to become 
an advantage of government because central banks first objective is to watch 
banking sector to keep market in equilibrium whenever it is needed, and funds 
back to prevent any possible crashes. So in order to be an independent central 
bank, interest rates must be defined solely by the bank. 
  
h. Central bank prohibits buying or selling of government securities in the primary 
market; TRNC government does not issue securities or treasury bonds to hold 
on to the funds. Reach the funds. So practically, central bank cannot buy or sell 
the securities from the primary market. 
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This is a significant issue for the central bank, because governments make use 
of this opportunity to fund back their budgets or for other expenses. Central 
bank is the governments’ financial agent in proceeding the selling and buying 
for the government.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The importance of providing price stability for the purpose of achieving economic 
targets, have been widely discussed in the literature and has been supported by the 
empirical studies on industrial countries. Accordingly, enhancing central bank 
independency within the modern economies has been the general tendency.  The 
ultimate point that has been achieved in empowering the central bank independency 
is the European Central Bank, with it independency strongly being protected by the 
Maastricht Treaty.   European Central Bank officially gives priority to the objective 
of price stability requiring full monetary independence. 
 
In this study, legal independence of TRNC Central Bank has been measured. Index 
value of 0.43 shows that TRNC Central Bank is legally more independent than most 
of the countries’ as evidenced by Cukierman’s (1992) index values.  From the past 
to the present these countries expectedly have taken precautions on increasing their 
central bank independencies and have reduced political interferences. 
 
Despite of the fact  that TRNC Central Bank can be counted as legally independent, 
it is not possible for it to pursue price stability target because TRNC Central Bank 
acts as Regulation and Supervision Institute that tries to provide financial stability 
rather than acting as the institute of setting the monetary policy. TRNC Central Bank 
can not set monetary policy due to the dolarization as cited before. Consequently, 
since the proponents of central bank independency assert that there exists an inverse 
relationship between inflation and central bank independence, the case of TRNC 
Central Bank can not be discussed on this ground.  It is the Turkey’s inflation that 
largely determines inflation for TRNC rather than the monetary policy pursued by 
TRNC Central Bank.  
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